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CONFLICTING COMMERCE CLAUSES: HOW RAICH AND
AMERICAN TRUCKING DISHONOR THEIR DOCTRINES
John W. Moorman*
INTRODUCTION
"The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States ... ."' So decided the Framers of our nation's consti-
tution, as they sought to divide powers in a federalist system and wrote what is
known today as the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause has been central to
Supreme Court decisions regarding federalism since its inception in the United States
Constitution. It explicitly allocates power to Congress for regulating interstate com-
merce and, thus, is a classic source of authority for federal statutes.2 Over time, how-
ever, the Supreme Court also has developed the "dormant Commerce Clause" as a
negative implication from the clause's text.3 The dormant doctrine is based on the
reasoning that if the federal government has the ability to regulate interstate commerce,
conversely, state government must not have that ability.4 As with all constitutional
doctrines, the Court has developed and refined the ordinary Commerce Clause and
dormant Commerce Clause doctrines over time.
Recently, the Supreme Court has decided two cases that involved the Commerce
Clause. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court approved congressional authority to enforce
a federal statute in the name of regulating interstate commerce.5 In American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, the Court found that
a state regulation did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.6 Together, these
cases portray the Court's modern understanding of the two legal doctrines rooted in the
Commerce Clause.
This Note will first look to the history of each Commerce Clause doctrine to
suggest their connection to each other, or lack thereof, in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.7 It will then analyze the highlighted cases in relation to long-term and current
trends in the doctrines' development. The Note will argue that the two cases inde-
pendently reflect grievous flaws in their respective doctrines.8 A comparison of these
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2007; B.S., Mclntire School of Commerce,
University of Virginia, 2004.U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 See infra Part I.A. 1. This Note will distinguish the Commerce Clause doctrine addres-
sing congressional authority as the "ordinary Commerce Clause."
3 See infra Part I.B. 1.
4 See infra Part I.B. 1.
' 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).
6 545 U.S. 429, 438 (2005).
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part II.A-B.
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cases will reveal that the Commerce Clause doctrines also are out of sync with each
other, despite being understood as reciprocal theories of law stemming from the same
exact text.9 Finally, this Note will suggest a possible revision of these doctrines that
would solve the problems inherent in the Supreme Court's modem understanding
of the Commerce Clause.'0
I. ANALYSIS OF EACH DOCTRINE'S HISTORY AND RELATION
TO THE MOST RECENT CASES
To fully analyze the implications of the Raich" and American Trucking 12 decisions
for their respective doctrines, a brief review of each doctrine's history is necessary.
Throughout our Constitution's history, the Supreme Court's focus on the Commerce
Clause has been constant, but the Court's interpretations of the clause have varied.'
3
These various interpretations compound to form trends from one Supreme Court era to
the next; yet, within the general trends, one can often find aberrational opinions and
decisions throughout the Court's development of a constitutional doctrine. 4 Of the two
cases this Note primarily examines, Raich will serve as an aberration from a modem
trend, 15 and American Trucking will serve as an extension of a historical trend.'
6
Despite this difference, both cases reflect a potential for sloppy interpretation of the
Commerce Clause made possible by the Court's past development of doctrine.
A. Ordinary Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The text of the Commerce Clause explicitly allows Congress the authority to regu-
late interstate commerce. 7 The Supreme Court's definition of commerce "among the
several States" has varied over time, and the historic trend has been an expansion of
what regulation is said to target interstate commerce. In that sense, Raich follows
the broad historical trend; however, it conflicts with the most recent precedent.
9 See infra Part II.C.
10 See infra Part III.
" Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
12 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429 (2005).
'3 Although interpretations have varied under both doctrines associated with the clause,
ordinary Commerce Clause interpretations have varied in a consistent direction, see infra
Part I.A. 1, whereas dormant Commerce Clause interpretations have varied more sporadically,
see infra Part I.B. 1.
14 See, e.g., infra note 25 and accompanying text.
"s See infra Part I.A.2.
16 See infra Part I.B.2.
'7 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Is E.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1193 (1986) (noting a "century of regulatory expansion"). For seminal cases along the
spectrum of this trend, see, forexample, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard




1. History of Ordinary Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Early Supreme Court decisions regarding the Commerce Clause addressed
general questions such as whether the clause covered activity that indirectly affected
interstate commerce and whether congressional actions constituted regulation of such
commerce.19 In the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court considered the
issue of what type of "commerce" the clause covered.20 The Court in Gibbons re-
jected an argument that the clause confined Congress's powers to interstate transpor-
tation of only goods, and did not extend them to the transportation of people across
state bounds.2'
Although the Court's definition of interstate commerce was confined to matters
of interstate transportation for many years,2 2 Gibbons's narrow expansion of con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause ultimately was the beginning of a
greater aggrandizement. Yet, before the Supreme Court expounded upon congres-
sional Commerce Clause authority, it limited that authority in the case of Hammer
v. Dagenhart.23 Hammer did not overturn the Gibbons holding outright.24 Instead,
it distinguished the Gibbons case, holding that production of goods was not interstate
commerce like their transportation, regardless of whether those goods might be trans-
ported out of state later.25
"9 E.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. For a summary of the facts and holding in this case,
see infra note 21.
20 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. Many scholars view Gibbons as the first in a number
of landmark cases that have defined Commerce Clause jurisprudence over time. See generally
Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 7, 17-45 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981) (providing
a general history of the dormant Commerce Clause).
21 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 140. The court in Gibbons found that a New York stat-
ute granting exclusive rights to steamboat business was unconstitutional, reasoning that the
statute directly conflicted with federal licenses of the same rights. Id. at 240. Interestingly, this
subject matter seems to fall squarely within the Supreme Court's modem dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. The dormant Commerce
Clause-yet undeveloped at the time of Gibbons-would seem to reject the statute regardless
of competing federal regulation, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text, but the Gibbons
opinion stressed this conflict explicitly. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 240. The opinion also
noted, "Commerce among the states, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state
.... It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely
internal .... Such a power [of Congress] would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary."
Id. at 194. On its face, this language seems to permit unfettered state regulation of any and
all commerce that physically transpires only within the state's bounds-a notion later
contravened in dormant Commerce Clause cases in the 1920s. See infra Part I.B. 1.
22 See infra text accompanying note 25.
23 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (finding no authority for a federal statute that, in effect,
prohibited child labor within states under the reasoning that the labor produced goods in
interstate commerce), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
24 Id. at 269-72.
25 Id. Some scholars have attributed this variation from the Gibbons opinion to the political
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Not until the case of United States v. Darby did the Supreme Court resume a
greater trend of aggrandizing congressional power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.26 Contrary to the Hammer Court's approach to precedent, the Darby opin-
ion expressly rejected the holding of Hammer as binding precedent.27 Darby created
the basis for further aggrandizement of congressional power through the Court's
explicit holding:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined
to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or
the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regu-
lation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.28
This expansive definition of legitimate ends provided liberal deference to congres-
sional actions and contrasted starkly with the Court's previous opinions.
The Court quickly cemented its holding in Darby with its opinion in Wickard
v. Filburn, in which it reiterated the principle that Congress may regulate intrastate
activity.29 But Wickard also took congressional authority a step further. The Court held
that federal regulation regarding farming quotas was valid as applied to an individual
state farmer under the Commerce Clause, by focusing on the "aggregate" effect of the
activity.30 The Court drew upon the aggregate effect theory in later cases to uphold
congressional action targeting various objectives under the guise of interstate com-
merce regulation.3
popularity of laissez-faire economics at the time. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 18, at 1229;
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1072-73 (1992). Indeed, the language of the
Hammer opinion more than suggests such motivation. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 269-70 ("In
other words, the power is one to control the means by which commerce is carried on, which
is directly the contrary of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus
destroy it as to particular commodities.").
26 Darby, 312 U.S. 100. Over a century after the Court decided Gibbons, the Darby case
upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. That act prohibits interstate shipment of goods
produced by employees working in conditions that do not satisfy certain requirements. Id.
at 112-13 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(1) (West 1998)).
27 Id. at 115-17.
28 Id. at 118 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
29 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942).
30 Id. at 127-29.
31 For example, the Court addressed racist practices in Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964): "[I]nterstate commerce may be impeded or distorted substantially
if local sellers of interstate food are permitted to exclude all Negro consumers. Measuring...
by the aggregate effect of a great number of such acts of discrimination, I am of the opinion
[Vol. 15:687
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Most recently, the Rehnquist Court attacked the broad aggrandizement of congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause.32 It did so by distinguishing precedent
and requiring a subject matter of economic activity.33 This movement began with the
case of United States v. Lopez, in which the Court found that federal prohibition of gun
possession in school zones was not properly addressed within the powers provided by
the Commerce Clause.' In requiring a substantial connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce, the Rehnquist Court denied Congress the power to
support any conceivable regulation with an attenuated and extremely indirect effect on
interstate commerce.35 Thus, Lopez seems to have established a long overdue limit
upon congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.36
2. Comparing Raich to Relevant Precedent
As the final ordinary Commerce Clause decision of the Rehnquist Court, Gonzales
v. Raich undoubtedly stands apart from its immediate predecessors. In this case, the
Court was faced with production and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes
that occurred completely within one state.37 Such medicinal use was permitted by state
statute, but the federal government charged that the growth and use of marijuana was
a violation of the Controlled Substances Act." The defendants claimed that regu-
lation of their activity by the federal government was unconstitutional.39 Writing
that Congress has constitutional power to regulate in this area." Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
This expansive reasoning was reapplied in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
which found "ample basis for the conclusion that established restaurants in such areas sold less
interstate goods because of the discrimination, that interstate travel was obstructed directly by
it, that business in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing
there as a result of it." Id. at 300.
32 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
134-41 (2004).
33 See id. at 136 ("'[C]ommerce' ... comprehends all 'economic activity."'). The failure
to overrule expansive precedent outright left the door open for Raich to reinstate it. See infra
Part I.A.2.
34 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act was not authorized by the
Commerce Clause because it did not regulate any activity that substantially affected interstate
commerce).
" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. See generally Gordon G. Young, The Significance of Border
Crossings: Lopez, Morrison and the Fate of Congressional Power to Regulate Goods, and
Transactions Connected with Them, Based on Prior Passage Through Interstate Commerce,
61 MD. L. REv. 177, 193 (2002) (suggesting Lopez and Morrison reflect a trend toward limit-
ing congressional regulatory authority).
36 See Young, supra note 32, at 136.
17 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
38 Id. at 5, 14 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2000)).
39 Id. at 15. It seems important here to stress the exact issue that the Supreme Court
2006]
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for a six-justice majority, Justice Stevens concluded in his opinion that the Controlled
Substances Act was constitutional as applied to the defendants, arguing that the
Commerce Clause allowed such regulation of state activity.' °
In supporting congressional regulation with an attenuated connection to inter-
state commerce, the decision in Raich unapologetically conflicts with what many
scholars viewed as the most recent trend in ordinary Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.4 ' Even the media were quick to point out the reversal that Raich reflected in
the current flux of the Court's historic Commerce Clause jurisprudence.42 If for no
other reason, the case is striking because its result by nature requires an unexpect-
edly expansive interpretation of Commerce Clause powers. Yet, Raich is surprising
for more reasons than the case's outcome.
Much of the language found in Raich seemingly runs counter to the Court's most
recent opinions on Commerce Clause issues.43 Particularly curious is the Court's
reliance on Wickard despite the passage of time and the decisions of other cases that
altered and redefined the meaning of the Commerce Clause: "Wickard thus estab-
lishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,'
in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.""
While drawing analogies between Raich and Wickard, the majority arguably ignored
the limits most recent cases imposed upon congressional regulation in favor of more
addressed in Raich. The case did not expressly concern the rightness or wrongness of medic-
inal marijuana; it addressed only whether the federal government's regulation of this intrastate
production and use was within the powers granted to Congress in the Constitution. Id. at 5.
This is not to say that the subject matter of the case is completely irrelevant. Indeed, the stigma
that accompanies marijuana use may have played a significant role in the case's outcome, but
the majority opinion simply never recognized this role. See infra note 109.
4o Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
4' See generally Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive
Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 403 (2002) (arguing that Lopez and Morrison indicated a surprising deviation from the
Court's prior Commerce Clause cases).
42 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say U.S. May Prohibit the Use of Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at Al ("The sharpest dispute was over the meaning
of two of the core decisions of the Rehnquist Court's approach to federalism. Both struck down
federal laws, the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act, on the
ground that they exceeded Congressional authority .. "); Editorial, Not About Pot, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2005, at A20 ('The result is a six-justice majority that stands strongly against
a revolutionary approach to commerce clause jurisprudence.").
41 Some deviation from the decisions and language in Lopez and Morrison might be ex-
pected, as Justice Stevens wrote neither of those opinions. Indeed, he dissented from the majority
in both cases. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628, 655 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995). His proclaimed adherence to those decisions from which
he very recently dissented is noteworthy and stands in stark contrast to the decisions themselves
4 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
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general trends of expanding regulatory power.45 By distinguishing the conflicting
precedent of recent cases, the majority in Raich cut short what some scholars had
deemed a revolution for federalism.' The majority, however, did not even expressly
recognize its own actions, choosing instead an approach that ignored the possibility
of contradiction.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued not only that the majority's
opinion contradicted recent precedent but also that its interpretation of recent pre-
cedent was nonsensical when carried to its logical conclusion:
[T]he Court appears to reason that the placement of local activity
in a comprehensive scheme confirms that it is essential to that
scheme. If the Court is right, then Lopez stands for nothing more
than a drafting guide: Congress should have described the rele-
vant crime as "transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in the
nation"--thus including commercial and noncommercial activity,
and clearly encompassing some activity with assuredly substantial
effect on interstate commerce.47
Likely due to arguments such as these, the majority opinion in Raich seems not to
focus on preserving more recent opinions; instead, it stresses the holdings made at
a time when congressional power through the Commerce Clause remained seemingly
unlimited.'
In its focus on the precedent of earlier Commerce Clause decisions and disregard
for more recent cases, Raich is best viewed as an aberration from the most recent trend
in doctrinal development and a return to older, less restrained views of congressional
authority.49 As such, the case provokes new questions as to the current meaning of
the clause and shrouds in uncertainty the direction its development will take in the
future. Although only time will tell the precise impact of Raich in these regards, the
great importance of the case to the Court's ordinary Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is unmistakable.
" Id. at 23 ("To support their contrary submission, respondents rely heavily on two of our
more recent Commerce Clause cases. In their myopic focus, they overlook the larger context
of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases .... Those two cases,
of course, are Lopez and Morrison." (citations omitted)).
4 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, What Ever Happened to Federalism?, TRIAL, Aug. 2005,
at 52, 52 ("[T]he Court strangled in its infancy the so-called federalism revolution that began
a mere 10 years ago ... ").
47 Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
48 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. Some suggest the real, hidden motivation
behind this counter-doctrinal decision can be found upon a close inspection of the majority's
opinion. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, 2004
-2005 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 71,91 (stressing the significance of the Court's fear that allowing
medical marijuana will lead to the legalization of recreational use); see also infra note 109.
"9 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court
Cases such as Wickard,50 Lopez,5 and Raich52 fall into one of two constitutional
doctrines tied to the Commerce Clause. Whereas those cases address the reach of
Congress in regulating activity among states, other cases have addressed the seemingly
complementary notion of state regulation in this regard. The latter group falls under
the Court's "dormant" Commerce Clause jurisprudence, termed as such because it is
based solely on an implication from the text of the clause, rather than the text itself.53
1. History of Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The dormant Commerce Clause is now understood as a mandatory negative impli-
cation from the text of the Commerce Clause that states may not regulate interstate
commerce if Congress holds that power.' Perhaps due to the lack of express con-
textual grounding, the Supreme Court initially struggled to clearly define any constant
doctrine regarding state regulation of interstate commerce.55 Indeed, Gibbons v.
Ogden was one of the first cases in which the Court addressed subject matter that
seems to fall clearly within modem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.5 6 Yet,
as previously noted,57 the Court hearing that early case did not consider any negative
aspect of the clause's text, as it does in modem cases; instead, it focused on an argu-
ment that federal regulation of interstate commerce was exclusive and supreme, or at
least preemptive.58 In this way, Gibbons demonstrates how the initial evolution of
dormant Commerce Clause theory was neither as quick nor as clear as the evolution
of ordinary Commerce Clause doctrine.
Confusion and indecision regarding state regulation of interstate commerce plagued
the Court for many years. Over time, it developed a test that was applied in search
of invalid state regulation of interstate commerce.59 That test found a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause when state activity "directly" burdened interstate
50 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
5' United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
52 Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
5 See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,252 (1946) ("In short, the Commerce Clause even
without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States."
(citations omitted)), abrogated by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
54 Id.
5 For an argument that dormant Commerce Clause theory remains the confused product
of a series of disjointed decisions, see Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Donnant Commerce Clause,
1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 126-30.
56 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
5 See supra note 21.
58 E.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210-22. "In every such case, the act of Congress,
or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers
not controverted, must yield to it." Id. at 211.
9 See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189 (1925) (prohibiting
regulation of wheat purchases within state for interstate shipment because it was a direct burden).
[Vol. 15:687
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commerce. 6° A refined version of that analysis can be found in the case of Di Santo
v. Pennsylvania.61 In that case, the Court considered a state law requiring a license
for businesses offering transportation tickets between Pennsylvania and foreign
countries.62 Although Di Santo did not concern commerce among multiple states in
America, it nevertheless portrayed the Court's then-developed test, which found
state regulation invalid when its burden on interstate commerce was sufficiently
direct.63
Di Santo is also noteworthy in that it contains the seed for a shift in the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' In this case, Justice Stone dissented and
rebuked the value of a test for directness in burden:
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquir-
ing whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect
seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and
too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of
the expressions, "direct" and "indirect interference" with com-
merce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe a
result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached.65
Subsequent cases echoed that dissenting proclamation, but in those cases Justice
Stone wrote for the majority. One such case, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan,66 is now credited with extinguishing the direct burden test.67 That case pro-
posed a rule allowing states to regulate interstate commerce that Congress was unable
to adequately address.68 Although this new formulation sought to expressly address
the line between state and federal regulatory powers through judicial discretion, it did
not create a definite standard by which states might evaluate their actions.69 Thus, the
confusion continued to some extent.
6 Id.
61 273 U.S. 34 (1927), abrogated by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
62 Id. at 35.
63 Id. at 41.
6 Di Santo also unambiguously rejected intent as a determinative factor when searching
for a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, thereby further developing the applicable test.
Id. at 37 ("A state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens
foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which
it was passed.").
65 Id. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting).
66 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
67 See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1183-84 (1986) (noting the impor-
tance of Southern Pacific in advocating a new test but questioning the actual implementation
of that test in subsequent cases).
68 Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. 761.
69 See Regan, supra note 67, at 1182-84 (noting the shortcomings of the Court's bal-
ancing test).
20061
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More recently, the case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 70 provided what many
scholars hailed as the answer to calls for a clear test for dormant Commerce Clause
violations. 71 The case established the following two-tiered test to determine whether
state activity affecting interstate commerce was constitutional: "Where the statute regu-
lates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. '72 This
test preserved the possibility for constitutional state regulation clearly provided for in
the Southern Pacific test but provided clarity that Southern Pacific lacked. 73 Further-
more, the Court in Pike looked beyond whether the state regulation was even-handed
and held incidental burdens on commerce unconstitutional under an additional tier,74
thereby establishing its significance in the greater analysis. The Court has reinforced
this tiered analysis in subsequent decisions.75
Besides establishing a clear, tiered analysis, Pike also hinted at a new factor to be
considered in searching for violations of the Commerce Clause: benefit to the state
in question.76 Recent opinions released by the Court confirm that favoritism in state
legislation is a key ingredient for a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.77 C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, is a recent case that demonstrates the per-
vasive importance of favoritism in the Court's analysis.78 In that case, the Court incor-
porated the formulation of Pike to restate its modem view of dormant Commerce
Clause analysis as follows: "For this inquiry, our case law yields two lines of analysis:
first, whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce; and second,
whether the ordinance imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is 'clearly
70 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (considering whether an Arizona requirement that a cantaloupe
grower package his product in order to ship it was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce).
71 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 217,223
n.21 (noting Pike as the court's "most famous formulation" of the dormant Commerce Clause
standard and Southern Pacific as Pike's "ultimate progenitor").
72 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
71 Southern Pacific addressed the two tiers later enumerated in Pike in a less coherent
fashion, noting first that "there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing
matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure . . . regulate [interstate
commerce]." 325 U.S. at 767, and later that "reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state
and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the com-
peting demands of the state and national interests involved." Id. at 768-79.
74 Pike, 397 U.S. at 146 ("Such an incidental consequence of a regulatory scheme could
perhaps be tolerated if a more compelling state interest were involved.").
71 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,389-90 (1994).
76 Pike, 397 U.S. at 145 ("[I]t is not easy to see why the other growers of Arizona are
entitled to benefit at the company's expense from the fact that it produces superior crops....").
77 See generally Regan, supra note 67, at 1182-84 (noting that protectionism or dis-
crimination could be reasons for the court to find a violation).
78 511 U.S. at 390.
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excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' 79 In this way, Carbone made
explicit a motive that some had already suspected was behind the Court's analysis.8°
From Gibbons to Carbone, the implications of the Commerce Clause for state
regulation have varied greatly. To be sure, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence differs greatly from the more one-sided and predictable developments
seen in cases addressing federal regulation.81 Nevertheless, trends within the history
of that jurisprudence do exist, and the most recent is the Court's express distaste for
states' protectionism of local business.8 2
2. Comparing American Trucking to Relevant Precedent
Unlike Raich, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service
Commission83 seems to fit neatly in the line of modem cases addressing dormant
Commerce Clause claims. The case involved a state law that imposed a one-hundred-
dollar annual fee on all trucks making intrastate deliveries within state bounds.' The
fees in question then helped fund the state's monitoring of the trucks on its roads. 85
In an appellate brief, the petitioner noted that the law applied equally to those trucks
making both interstate and intrastate deliveries. 86 The petitioner further argued that
such trucks typically created far less intrastate traffic than trucks committed entirely
to intrastate traffic. 7 Ultimately, the Court rejected the claim of a violation.88
" Id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) and quoting
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
o For an article predating Carbone and arguing that preventing state protectionism is the
Court's primary goal in modem dormant Commerce Clause cases, see Regan, supra note 67,
at 1206.
" See supra Part I.A.1.
82 Forgiving momentarily the arguably tenuous finding of a negative inference from the
Commerce Clause, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence seems more closely connected
to the implied text than is the case in ordinary Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Whereas the
dormant doctrine maintains focus on more substantial effects on "interstate commerce," the
ordinary Commerce Clause stretches that term's definition to its limit and beyond. See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942). Nevertheless, the increasing focus on pro-
tectionism when applying the dormant Commerce Clause is alarming due to what this trend
suggests about the doctrine's future development, even though the more simplistic search for
any burden has not yet been rejected outright.
83 545 U.S. 429 (2005).
8 Id. at 431.
85 Id.
8 Brief for the Petitioners at 2-4, Am. Trucking Ass'ns, v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545
U.S. 429 (2005) (No. 03-1230).
87 Id. at 8. Thus, the petitioner argued that the fee discriminated because it was not applied
in accordance with the disparate traffic each type of truck produced. Id.
88 American Trucking, 545 U.S. at 438.
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As in similar cases leading up to American Trucking, the Court based its find-
ing on a search for benefit to state business and discrimination against interstate
commerce. 9 The Court generally justified its analysis not in the Constitution's text,
but rather in its established holding that the Constitution "'was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together.' "9 From that basic
proposition, the Court continued to cite a string of cases in piecemeal to achieve sup-
port for its modern dormant Commerce Clause test.9' This approach allowed the Court
to present American Trucking as a simple reiteration of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine it had previously defined.92 The case, however, has a greater meaning for
the doctrine than it may seem to have at first glance.
That the American Trucking Court never initially found the fee in question even
had a definite effect on interstate commerce is particularly noteworthy.93 Indeed, only
after it analyzed the possibility of discrimination did the Court question whether the
case presented a burden on interstate commerce, and even then the Court mentioned
it only in passing.' The absence of any search for an actual burden on interstate com-
merce is noteworthy because this question alone seemingly would decide earlier cases
that required a burden before addressing its directness.95 By focusing on an analysis
of discrimination and favoritism without addressing whether the fee actually affects
interstate commerce, American Trucking reflects the true motivation behind the
89 Id. at 433-37.
o Id. at 433 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
9' Id. (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99-100
(1994); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137,142 (1970); Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)). Part of
the reason the Court cites to so many cases for different principles is that its interpretation
of the dormant Commerce Clause has varied so greatly depending on the subject matter of
each case. See generally Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 414 (1998)
("[T]he Court's analysis of the various cases presumably depends at least in part upon the
substantive category into which the case is placed. That the analytical approach used by the
Court should depend upon the substantive area affected creates the possibility for confusion.").
92 Yet another indicator of the Court's belief that the case presented an issue previous law
had clearly determined was the general brevity of the majority opinion, at less than eight full
pages. American Trucking, 545 U.S. at 431-38; cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5-33 (2005)
(majority opinion spanning twenty-nine pages).
" In Carbone, the Court noted as a preliminary matter that the case presented a burden on
interstate commerce. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,389 (1994)
("At the outset we confirm that the flow control ordinance does regulate interstate commerce,
despite the town's position to the contrary."). Although thecase is known for the analysis
it applied from that point on, the existence of a burden in that case was noted as a logical pre-
requisite to that analysis. Id.
' American Trucking, 545 U.S. at 438 ("In sum, petitioners have failed to show that
Michigan's fee.., either burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce .... ).




Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis. That motivation is a desire to prevent
states from instituting measures protective of their own economic interests.96
Through its nearly exclusive focus on discrimination in American Trucking, the
Court again refined its interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause. It applied pre-
viously established analysis in such a way as to give the factor of favoritism an effect
that overshadows other more essential considerations."a Thus, the importance of the
case arises not from any new law or rule it provides through its outcome, but rather
from the implications of its language and analytical structure.98 American Trucking,
unlike Raich, has received no significant immediate attention from scholars or the
media.99 Nevertheless, its significance to the modem theory of the dormant Commerce
Clause is also great, albeit in a more subtle aspect of the opinion.
II. FABRICATION AND DISUNITY IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINES
REFLECTED IN RAICH AND AMERICAN TRUCKING
As with most any constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Commerce Clause have drawn criticism throughout their development. Yet,
criticism surrounding these particular doctrines has been heavier than for most. The
Court's decisions regarding federal and state regulations under the clause seem parti-
cularly susceptible to such criticism for a number of reasons. Fallacy in each doctrine
can be argued when examining Raich'° and American Trucking'°' independently of
one another; however, a comparison of the two cases" makes flaws in the Court's
interpretations of the Commerce Clause all the more clear.
A. Independent Analysis of Fallacy in Raich
Through its dismissal of conflict in recent cases and focus on decisions that have
aggrandized Commerce Clause powers, Raich serves as an intriguing example of
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In one sense, the case has created a clear
problem for the establishment and adherence to precedent by ignoring the applicability
of recent cases. 3 Although it has confused the recent trend in defining interstate
commerce, the case also has revealed a greater problem by demonstrating the con-
ceivable extent of valid congressional regulation under the clause."°
96 See Regan, supra note 67, at 1206.
97 American Trucking, 545 U.S. at 433.
98 These implications are addressed infra in Part I.B.
9 Cf Ken Thomas, Michigan's Truck Fees Upheld: Supreme Court Says Tax Doesn't
Deter Interstate Activity, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 21, 2005, at C3 (providing only a short
summary of the case in a localized publication).
'0o See infra Part II.A.
lo' See infra Part II.B.
102 See infra Part II.C.
'03 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
" See generally Kmiec, supra note 48, at 72 (concluding that Raich displaced Wickard
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1. Precedent Dishonored in Raich
The majority opinion in Raich distinguished recent precedent from the statute
it addressed in an effort to render the disagreeable precedent inapplicable. 05 The
opinion suggested that the statute in Raich encompassed a complex scheme of regu-
lation that included intrastate activity, and the holdings of both Lopez and Morrison
could not apply because those cases regulated intrastate activity in a more targeted
and specific manner. 0 6 Yet, the attempt to distinguish those cases fails when con-
sidering the logical ramifications of the majority's understanding of their holdings."°
There is a critical disconnect in the majority's reasoning that because the Controlled
Substances Act encompasses intrastate activity, Lopez and Morrison allow regulation
of the activity as an essential part of a greater scheme. 10 Whatever the motive for
the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the law of those cases in Raich, 9 its decision
is ultimately untenable.
The majority's insupportable denial of recent precedent in Raich effectually under-
mines the consistency and objectivity in judgment which are central to the Supreme
Court's authority."0 Scholars have not only questioned the reasoning of the majority
opinion but also have immediately recognized that the decision is "flatly inconsistent
with Lopez and Morrison."' " This recognition of capriciousness in turn belittles the
v. Filburn as the outer limit of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
10 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-26 (2005). Interestingly, this attempt to distinguish
precedent rather than overturn it mirrors the approach of Hammer v. Dagenhart-another
ordinary Commerce Clause case in which the opinion similarly defied a recent trend in pre-
cedent and was ultimately overturned. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
106 E.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 ("[W]hen "'a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute
is of no consequence .... (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995))).
'o See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
1 One motive seems particularly likely to be at play. Before distinguishing the precedent
of Lopez and Morrison, the majority in Raich discussed at great length the history behind,
not only the statute at hand, but the regulation of marijuana in general. E.g., Raich, 545 U.S.
at 14 ("In enacting the CSA, Congress classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug....
Schedule I drugs are categorized as such because of their high potential for abuse, lack of any
accepted medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised treat-
ment."). Yet, the details of reasons for regulation of marijuana seem to deal more with the
rightfulness of regulation in general, and they seem irrelevant in answering the question of
which government (federal or state) might impose regulation. Id. The discussion of historic
regulation of marijuana and supportive reasoning thus seems to betray an unspoken motive
in the Court's ruling: a belief that prohibition of marijuana use or manufacture of any kind is
justified however achieved.
"0 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (providing
a general summation of the binding effect of stare decisis).
il. See Bradley, supra note 46, at 52.
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external credibility of the judicial system." 2 Furthermore, the Court's attempt to dis-
tinguish disagreeable precedent, rather than to overturn it outright, muddles the law
regarding Commerce Clause authority." 3 By cementing in its jurisprudence holdings
that stand at odds with each other, the Supreme Court has created decisive precedent
to support both sides of the debate over interstate commerce in the future.
2. Raich' s Removal of Rational Limits on Commerce Clause Authority
By focusing on Wickard, Raich demonstrates the possibility for limitless congres-
sional regulation that lies within the well-established history of Commerce Clause
decisions, and it threatens to turn that possibility into a reality. "4 Even if the Court
ultimately treats Raich as a meaningless deviation from the recent trend toward limiting
congressional authority, the case implicates the possibility that such authority may
stray even further from literal regulation of commerce "among the several states" at
some point in the future." 5 In this sense, Raich epitomizes the potential to ground
limitless congressional authority over states in historic Supreme Court precedent.
The infinite congressional authority that Raich portends threatens the very structure
of federalism." 6 This threat is exactly what the decisions in recent precedent sought
to eliminate by requiring that an activity's effect on interstate commerce be substantial
before Congress might regulate it.' 7 The merits of that requirement resound in Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Raich: "One of federalism's chief virtues, of course,
is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that 'a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.""' The decision in Raich
"' For a summary of the importance of precedent in judicial decision-making and the effects
of its use, see Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1156, 1158-67 (2005).
13 See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 48, at 87-88.
"14 Justice O'Connor noted this threat in her dissent in Raich, stating that "the Court an-
nounces a rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the
Commerce Clause-nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regu-
latory schemes-rather than with precision." Raich, 545 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"5 See Kmiec, supra note 48, at 72-75 (noting that the Raich decision has expanded the
limits of federal power).
116 Justice O'Connor noted this threat in her dissenting opinion: "If the Court always defers
to Congress as it does today, little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers." Raich, 545
U.S. at 47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"I United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
1' Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). As Justice O'Connor notes,
the virtues of federalism are undoubtedly strong and seem quashed by the holding in Raich.
Beyond the ability of one state to experiment with innovative social and economic concepts,
federalism also promotes efficient and responsive governance by increasing accountability.
Along the same lines, federalism also provides benefits of participatory self-government and
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casts doubt on whether federalism and its virtues will survive future federal regulations
under the supposed Commerce Clause authority provided in that case.
B. Independent Analysis of Fallacy in American Trucking
Like Raich, American Trucking serves an important representative function for its
respective Commerce Clause doctrine. Yet, American Trucking achieves this function
as a natural progression from the sequence of decisions leading up to it," 9 whereas
Raich represents the possibility of a new judicial theory stemming from historic pre-
cedent.'20 American Trucking is the most recent step in the trend toward a new dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.' 2' As such, it takes the revolutionary analysis of Carbone
that was already criticized as wayward and unsubstantiated,122 and often misapplied, 123
and pushes it further through an exclusive focus on that case's principles. Fallacies
contained in the American Trucking decision, therefore, are not unique in regard to
recent cases dealing with the dormant Commerce Clause, but they are more clearly
present in that case than in its predessors 24
The central flaw that the American Trucking opinion demonstrates in the Court's
doctrinal analysis is its degree of separation from any text found in the Constitution.'"
The argument that modem dormant Commerce Clause doctrine lacks constitutional
support is not groundbreaking.126 One author summarized an arguable lack of con-
stitutional support for the dormant Commerce Clause by noting, "the widespread
endorsement of a judicially enforceable rule that state and local governments may
not discriminate against interstate commerce appears, instead, to arise from the wide-
spread perception that this rule is a very good idea.' 27 Some scholars of today's
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine take their criticism even further, arguing that
the principle of a negative implication to the text of the clause is itself invalid.,
2
protection against tyranny, which are less achievable under a national government due to the
increase in scale and resulting wider disbursement of citizens. For a recent discussion of the
debate over federalist principles, see Steven G. Calabresi, "The Era of Big Government is
Over, " 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1998) (reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERAIST
PAPERS (1997)). In that article, Professor Calabresi reviews and criticizes a contemporary
book defending the constitutional underpinnings of today's large national government. Id.
In doing so, he provides an excellent argument for the undying nature of federalist principles
in today's society and a call for their protection. Id.
, See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 71, at 219.
123 See, e.g., Rachel D. Baker, C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown: A Wake-up Call for the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 67, 83 (1995).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
126 E.g., Heinzerling, supra note 71, at 218-19.
127 Id. at 219.
12' E.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
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Indeed, American Trucking contains a concurring argument by Justice Thomas that
the dormant Commerce Clause is completely a creation of the Court and has no place
in judicial analysis. 29
Analysis of the majority's opinion in American Trucking could support both of
the arguments above. To begin with, the opinion lacks any citation to the Constitution
for direct support, as is the norm for modem cases under the doctrine.' 30 Although
the Court cites to the Commerce Clause, it does so only in indirect connection to its
own implications. 3 ' Yet, the implication of a reciprocal or "dormant" doctrine is not
undoubtedly required by the Constitution's text. Quite simply, to give a power to a
governmental body does not automatically require that the power be exclusive. Indeed,
many powers are shared by multiple governmental bodies out of necessity, and the
same is possible for the Commerce Clause.
32
Although the Constitution does not necessarily require that the power to regulate
interstate commerce be exclusive, there may still be a valid or practical use for the prin-
ciple of exclusivity in this context. But recognition of the tenuous support for a dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine is cause to guard against a meaning that even slightly
exceeds the implied text. In its restricted focus on state protectionism, American
Trucking indicates that the Court has begun to exceed the text it purports to imply.1
33
The implication that states may not regulate interstate commerce does not overtly
suggest the issue of protectionism, and that implication itself is not expressly sup-
ported in the Constitution."M Such attenuation in reasoning removes any analysis
of the meaning in the Constitution's text from the Court's doctrine. Although most
425,435 (1982) (arguing that "[t]he time-honored rationales for traditional dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence have become historical vestiges").
29 Am. Trucking Ass'ns, v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429,439 (2005) (Thomas,
J., concurring). Justice Thomas's entire opinion reads: "I would affirm the judgment of the
Michigan Court of Appeals because "'[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in appli-
cation," and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute."' Id. (quoting
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59,68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Camps/Newfound/Owatunna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
130 See Heinzerling, supra note 71, at 219 & n.10.
'3' American Trucking, 545 U.S. at 433 ("[T]his Court has consistently held that the Consti-
tution's express grant to Congress of the power to 'regulate Commerce... among the several
states,' Art. I, § 8, cl.3, contains 'a further negative command, known as the dormant Commerce
Clause."' (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995))).
132 For instance, both state and federal government have the power of eminent domain.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONsTrrurnONAL LAW: PRNCIPLES AND PouCIES 615 (2d ed. 2002).
'.. American Trucking, 545 U.S. at 434. Indeed, the closing remarks of the majority's
opinion betray this point when it concludes that the statute in question did not violate "the
Commerce Clause in any other relevant way." Id. at 438 (emphasis added). That conclusion
is curious in its suggestion that any violation of the Commerce Clause could be irrelevant to
the Court's analysis.
" See Regan, supra note 67, at 1206.
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scholars support the outcomes of American Trucking and like cases,135 this "ends justify
the means" mentality allows the Supreme Court to become something more than the
arbiter of the Constitution,'36 thus disrupting the balance of our system of government.
C. Comparison of Commerce Clause Doctrines Applied in Raich and
American Trucking
When two doctrines are understood to stem from reciprocal texts, one would expect
these doctrines to allow negative inferences that withstand reasonable application.
Such is not the case with the ordinary Commerce Clause and its dormant counter-
part. When comparing the decisions and reasoning in Raich and American Trucking,
the fallacies inherent in the Supreme Court's application of the Commerce Clause
doctrines become clear. As this analysis shall reveal, the doctrines themselves are far
from reciprocal; rather, they are so disjointed that implementing the inverse under-
standing of one doctrine to the other's context achieves nonsensical results.
1. Reciprocal Reasoning of American Trucking Applied in the Context of Raich
The near-exclusive focus on state protectionism in American Trucking is the trade-
mark of the Court's latest dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'37 Yet, as pre-
viously noted, this aspect of the Court's analysis is difficult to ground in the text of
the clause or even a negative implication thereof.'38 This reality suddenly becomes
obvious when considering the conceivable implications of the protectionism focus
for the reciprocal doctrine.
The search for protectionist measures associated with modem dormant Commerce
Clause analysis is not to be found in Raich or like cases for a good reason: it does not
fit. If the dormant doctrine is truly founded in reasoning of negative implications,'39
then a guard against state-promoted protectionism by the dormant Commerce Clause
would equate to permission of federally promoted protectionist measures. Raich and
other similar cases, however, address only the broader issue of whether interstate com-
merce is being regulated, without ever considering whether Congress is favoring any
particular state through its regulation."4 This absence of permissive state favoritism
in ordinary Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be explained by the same reason
the Court and scholars approve of disallowing favoritism in the dormant Commerce
Clause: a belief that protectionist measures are undesirable in any form. 4'
13- See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 71, at 219.
136 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'37 See supra Part I.B.
131 See supra Part II.B.
'31 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
'" Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
'4' See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 71, at 219; Regan, supra note 67.
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More generally, the scope of the Court's ordinary Commerce Clause juris-
prudence is simply far too vast to be applied as a reciprocal version of the dormant
Commerce Clause and still maintain the current analysis of the ordinary doctrine.
Although a dormant test that examines state regulation for any effect on interstate com-
merce may have some merit, 42 the Court's focus on protectionism targets a spectrum
of state activity that is much narrower.143 Such disjointed scopes cast further doubt
on the doctrine's supposed reciprocity.
Although the Court in American Trucking necessarily seeks to derive support for
its decision in the power granted by the Commerce Clause,'" the Court's own direct
interpretations of that text-in ordinary Commerce Clause cases-say nothing re-
garding state-protective activity. This disharmony in doctrines demonstrates that the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to some extent a contradictory fabrication.
2. Reciprocal Reasoning of Raich Applied in the Context of American Trucking
Just as certain arguments in the American Trucking opinion do not withstand scru-
tiny in cases like Raich, some ordinary Commerce Clause principles are clearly flawed
when viewed within a dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Of principal note is the
limitless definition of "interstate commerce" that Raich revives.'45 This element of
ordinary Commerce Clause analysis seems particularly questionable when compared
to the dormant Commerce Clause context.
Injecting the broad definition of interstate commerce into the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine would require a ridiculous shift in analysis. The Court currently re-
stricts application of the doctrine to those situations that directly involve interstate
transportation of goods and services," but the understanding of interstate commerce
found in Raich would require the court to consider whether a huge variety of state
activity violates the dormant Commerce Clause.' 47 For instance, if Raich is viewed
as allowing the regulation in Lopez under a broader statutory scheme, 48 by the Court's
reasoning of negative implications it would have to consider whether regulation of
guns in schools on the state level violates the dormant Commerce Clause.149 By the
same reasoning, state statutes equivalent to the one struck down in Morrison150 could
142 Indeed, Part III of this Note will argue for revision that achieves exactly that effect.
143 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
'" Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005).
145 Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19.
146 E.g.,American Trucking, 545 U.S. 429; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970);
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34 (1927); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189 (1925).
14" Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19.
148 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
149 United States v. Lopez, 514U.S. 549,551 (1995) (addressing the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990).
"' United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,601 (2000) (addressing the Violence Against
Women Act).
2006] 705
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
present a serious issue of authority when applying the definition of interstate commerce
found in some ordinary Commerce Clause cases. Clearly, such an all-encompassing
restriction on state regulatory authority undermines our federalist system of government
in a way too extreme even for today's Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the two-tiered structure of dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence established in Carbone5' and Pike52 also makes little sense when carried over
to the ordinary Commerce Clause context. The analysis of the ordinary doctrine con-
tains only one of the two tiers-a search for discriminatory effect-and entirely avoids
any sort of additional balancing test for incidental effects. Indeed, the test for federal
authority of whether there is an aggregate economic effect found in Wickard,'53 and
now Raich,'54 instead strongly suggests the complete unimportance of whether the
effect is incidental. In this way, the application of Raich's doctrine as a reciprocal of
the doctrine in American Trucking again defies practical connection between the two.
Thus, although the majority in Raich argues its adherence to the Constitution's
provision regarding interstate commerce,155 it enforces a definition of that term so ex-
pansive that including it in the Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is prac-
tically unthinkable. As another major inconsistency in the application of the Commerce
Clause, the noncorrelative definitions of each doctrine demonstrate how the Court's
interpretations have gone awry.
I. SUGGESTED REVISION FOR THE COURT'S COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINES
Given the numerous problems of modern Commerce Clause cases outlined above,
both doctrines under the clause demand repair. The disjointed nature of the doctrines
stresses just how unsupported and muddled each of them is. The inconsistencies that
plague the Court's current understanding of the Commerce Clause serve to emphasize
the problems that underlie both of the doctrines said to stem from its text. Needed
revision and the reasons for it are, therefore, somewhat self-evident. In short, the two
doctrines of the clause would both benefit greatly from a mutual curtailment that allows
their reciprocity to withstand critical scrutiny.
A. Ordinary Commerce Clause: Redefining "Interstate Commerce" and Adding a
Second Tier of Analysis
The Court should first revise its definition of interstate commerce to include only
regulation which creates a substantial effect,'56 regardless of whether the regulation in
' C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994).
152 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
113 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942).
' Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2005).
Id. at 25-26.
156 E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,611 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995).
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question falls into a larger scheme. This would be possible through a reading of the im-
mediate precedent leading up to Raich that differs from the majority's interpretation
in that case.'57 Ideally, this revision would produce an analysis that looks very similar
to that of the Lopez and Morrison cases." 8 The most direct and effective way of
achieving that revision, therefore, is to overturn Raich outright. There seems no other
way of completely removing the residual confusion and potential abuse of precedent
in the future. 59
In ordinary Commerce Clause cases in which regulation of an intrastate activity
is only a part of greater regulation of a different matter, a balancing of federal and state
interests is the clearest way to determine which entity has power, as opposed to a per
se exception to state authority within the definition of Commerce Clause powers."
The addition of this balancing test would also serve as a counterpart to the second tier
of analysis in recent dormant Commerce Clause cases, 161 thus eliminating another
incongruence between the two reciprocal doctrines.162
A revised understanding of interstate commerce in the Court's ordinary Commerce
Clause jurisprudence would resolve a major inconsistency between it and its sister
doctrine. A requirement of substantial effect more closely resembles the already con-
fined subject matter of the dormant Commerce Clause. 63 In this way, a reciprocal
requirement that state regulation be allowed if it does not substantially affect inter-
state commerce fits well within established precedent." Such coherence would re-
solve current confusion over the ordinary Commerce Clause doctrine and restore
17 Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
158 The obvious problem with this approach is a conflict with stare decisis. The reasoning
behind that principle, however, concerns the need for consistency in the Court's decisions
in order to establish its authority as a reliable source of law. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting further that "the rule of stare decisis
is not an 'inexorable command'). Raich already disserves any authority derived from the
Court's consistency to such an extent that reversal of that case would arguably negate any
detriment to stare decisis, if not outweigh it.
' The pitfalls of attempts to revise doctrine through distinguishment can be found in
this Note. For instance, the Court attempted to limit the meaning of "commerce" in Hammer,
but that attempt failed when the decision was expressly overruled in Darby. See supra notes
27-28 and accompanying text. Likewise, Lopez and Morrison attempted to restrict congres-
sional authority once more, see supra notes 34-35, but failed because they did not expressly
overrule past precedent, leaving it to be adopted again in the future. See supra notes 43-44
and accompanying text.
"6 The design of such a per se rule, excepting the state's typical power to regulate matters
within its bounds, seems to be what allowed the majority in Raich to provide the regulation
in question with blanket protection from more intense scrutiny. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
161 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,389 (1994); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
163 See supra Part I.B.1.
'64 See supra Part I.B.
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from endangerment the virtues of federalism. 65 A substantial effect test would also
bring the doctrine into a stricter adherence to the Constitution's text and provide a
clearer meaning and enhanced reliability to precedent in this context.16
B. Dormant Commerce Clause: Removing the Analysis of Protectionism
The fallacy contained in modem dormant Commerce Clause doctrine also calls for
revision. 67 Quite simply, the Court should refrain from any analysis of state protec-
tionism and should instead ask only whether the states are regulating interstate com-
merce. In essence, this revision would resemble a return to earlier cases in which the
Court considered only whether regulation created a direct burden. " The best approach
to this revision is to adopt a test for substantial economic effect, as this type of test has
been applied successfully in past cases regarding the ordinary Commerce Clause. 1
69
It also would correspond directly to revisions of that doctrine suggested above.
Removing the protectionism focus would further resolve the inconsistencies con-
tained in the law of the Commerce Clause. 70 This revision would simultaneously
return the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to firmer constitutional ground and
allow all inferences of reciprocal reasoning to apply in ordinary Commerce Clause
cases.' 7' The per se invalidity of all substantial state regulation of interstate commerce
also would likely keep satisfied the many scholars that support guards against protec-
tionist measures, 72 as these measures would still be encompassed within the greater
reach of a per se rule. These authors might argue states' regulation of interstate com-
merce that serves their benefit without harming others would be wrongly invalidated
by this revision of doctrine. 7 3 However, the enhanced reliability and clarity in
decision-making outweighs this risk, especially when considering that the revision's
161 See supra Part I.A.2.
" See supra Part I.A.2. In this vein, a clear overruling of certain arguments in Raich again
would create more definite and desirable guidelines for future cases than would yet another
attempt to distinguish. See supra note 159.
167 See supra Part II.B.
161 E.g., Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34,37 (1927). Although there may be some merit
to the arguments of Justice Stone that a test for directness is too vague to enforce, see supra
note 65 and accompanying text, if rephrased in terms of substantial effect, courts would find
application of the rule less problematic. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
169 E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,611 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549,556-57 (1995). After all, applying the law to such fact-specific determinations of sub-
stantiality is a primary function of the courts, and in this situation, they could at least perform
that function with the firm backing of reliable precedent and constitutional text.
170 See supra Part II.C.
'7' See supra Part II.B.
7 See, e.g., Regan, supra note 67, at 1143 ("Proponents of motive review [within the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis] now argue nearly unopposed.").
" See Heinzerling, supra note 71, at 275 (arguing that, on the whole, "the nondiscrimi-
nation principle serves none of the objectives commonly cited in favor of it").
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true effect is only to ensure that Congress, not the states, has the power to implement
such beneficial regulation.
C. Shared Benefits of Revision
The combined effect of this revision with that of the ordinary Commerce Clause
doctrine would be to afford each individual doctrine enhanced reliability through a
firmer footing in precedent and the text of the Constitution. To that end, it would also
free their mutual existence from the inconsistency that currently sabotages their
reasoned application.' 74 In restricting itself to a more literal interpretation of the
clause's text, the Court would also protect against its own tendency to complicate and
obscure established analysis to achieve outcomes it may deem desirable. 175 Desirable
outcomes deserve less tenuous reasoning and more solid support in our Constitution's
text than the Commerce Clause often provides.'76
A final benefit of revision worth considering is the resulting simplification that
would occur in subsequent doctrinal analysis. In returning both doctrines to the single
question of whether an action substantially affects interstate commerce, the suggested
revision provides a bright-line rule and makes the judicial system more transparent to
the public.'77 Such transparency in turn would decrease litigation rooted in Commerce
Clause arguments, and state and federal governments could more easily take necessary
' See supra Part II.C. This inconsistency is arguably the primary problem with the two
doctrines because it makes the Court's fabrications most visible and so contradicts the negative
implications that are fundamental to the entire dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
"7 Again, Raich arguably serves as one of the most recent and blatant examples of this "ends
justify the means" reasoning. See supra note 109. Applying the suggested revisions to the
analysis of that case would demand a different outcome in the name of preserving federalism;
yet these revisions maintain the important constitutional check against state-sponsored pro-
tectionist measures.
176 It goes without saying that the outcomes of cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
were ultimately just and necessary. To focus on the favorable results those decisions created,
however, is to ignore the parity of negative outcomes that also potentially follows from such
loose interpretation of the Constitution. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REv. 621,674 (1990) ("A focus on the text alone, it is argued, is a more concrete
inquiry which will better constrain the tendency of judges to substitute their will for that of
Congress."). For instance, the same over-inclusive view conceivably might also allow the
Court to approve federal Jim Crow laws in the name of interstate commerce regulation-an
abominable outcome. Tightening the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause thus nets
a zero effect on equitable considerations while preserving the principles of federalism, and it
simultaneously empowers the court by strengthening its reliance on precedent. See supra note
110 and accompanying text.
177 This broadly applicable test would further quell scholarly criticism over the great vari-
ation in analyses applied under each doctrine from one case to the next. See, e.g., Tushnet,
supra note 55, at 126-30.
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steps to remain within the powers prescribed them through the Commerce Clause,
independent of judicial guidance.'78
CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated how Raich and American Trucking contain impor-
tant implications for the meaning of their respective Commerce Clause doctrines. 1
79
Whereas Raich represents the revival of a doctrine cemented in historic precedent,
80
American Trucking serves as a continuation of a current doctrinal trend.'81 In these
representative functions, each case demonstrates fallacy within the dormant and ordi-
nary Commerce Clause doctrines. "8 The cases demonstrate contradiction in precedent,
analytical formulations that are overly complex and variable, and a lack of firm and
consistent support for the reasoning they implement.'83 A comparison of the cases
further clarifies the problems in their doctrines, and it reveals that they are to some
degree a fabrication of the Court because their reasoning cannot be mutually applied
through the Court's purported theory of reciprocity.'
The Supreme Court should revise the "reciprocal" doctrines of the Commerce
Clause and tailor them so that they do in fact relate in such a manner.'85 This effort
would not only clarify the Supreme Court's analysis and create precedent it might
easily follow but also return the Court to guidelines that more closely adhere to the
meaning of our Constitution's text.'86 The principles of federalism are worth defend-
ing, 8 7 and revisions of the Commerce Clause doctrines such as those suggested in
this Note are necessary to their survival.
178 To some extent, transparency in any Supreme Court doctrine will be difficult to achieve
if only for the reason that the Court must interpret provisions of a document over 200 years
old into to the law of modem American society. Yet, this difficulty only furthers the need for
revisions such as those suggested in this Note, as any clarification of the Constitution's law
is a valuable aid.
"71 See supra Part I.
's See supra Part I.A.2.
181 See supra Part I.B.2.
182 See supra Part II.A-B.
181 See supra Part II.A-B.
" See supra Part I.C.
..5 See supra Part III.
'8 See supra Part III.
187 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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